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ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
EFFICIENCY VS. EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS 
CEPS Working Document No. 301/September 2008 
STINE AAKRE & DIRK T.G. RÜBBELKE
* 
1. Introduction 
Climate change presents the European Union with a dual challenge, and an appropriate response 
requires a two-pronged approach. First, in order minimise the most crippling impacts of climate 
change, greenhouse gas concentrations have to be reduced. Accordingly, transition to a low-
carbon economy through measures to mitigate emissions constitutes a central pillar of the EU’s 
climate change policy (European Commission, 2007a). Second, since climate change is already 
occurring, a climate policy based on mitigation must be coupled with measures that are 
designed to effectively adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change (European 
Commission, 2007a; IPCC, 2007). The latter requirement motivated the European 
Commission’s launch of a Green Paper on adaptation in 2007, which sought to initiate a debate 
on how to devise an efficient and coordinated adaptation strategy for Europe.  
To concentrate EU adaptation activities, the Green Paper outlines a four-action approach, 
among which developing adaptation strategies “in order to identify optimal resource allocation 
and efficient resource use which will guide actions at EU level, through EU sectoral and other 
policies and the available Community Funds” constitutes one of the four priority areas 
(European Commission, 2007a, p. 13). First of all, the European Commission identifies a need 
to define an appropriate role for the EU centrally, the scope for a Community level policy 
strategy and how best to assist local, regional and national adaptation efforts. Since there are 
several policy areas that will be directly or indirectly affected by the impacts of climate change, 
and since the impacts will inevitably vary from region to region “depending on physical 
vulnerability, the degree of socio-economic development, natural and human adaptive capacity, 
health services and disaster surveillance mechanisms”, the Commission recognises the need for 
a multilevel governance-approach: “Whilst a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to adaptation is clearly 
not appropriate, climate change will nevertheless impact everywhere and those impacts will not 
follow administrative boundaries. In many areas adaptation will require a cross-boundary 
approach” (European Commission, 2007a, pp. 11-12). Second, the social dimension of an EU 
adaptation strategy is underscored: “In order to ensure that the poorer and disadvantaged regions 
and those regions that will be hit hardest by climate change will be able to take the necessary 
measures” (European Commission, 2007a, p. 12). Accordingly, in addition to expressing a need 
to define an appropriate division of labour between the different levels of government, in the 
Green Paper the European Commission points to the need to consider how adaptation can be 
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taken into account in EU spending programmes, such as the Structural and Cohesion spending 
programmes.  
Along similar lines, the new Cohesion Policy (2007-2013) stresses the importance of climate 
change in EU cohesion policy (European Commission, 2007b).
1 The Structural and Cohesion 
spending programmes are concentrated on Lisbon (innovation, growth, jobs) and Gothenburg 
(sustainable development) goals. In the period 2007-2013, cohesion policy will amount to €308 
billion, 62% of which should finance projects linked to the Lisbon objectives (Artim et al., 
2008).  
Against this backdrop, in this paper we assess the appropriate levels of adaptation policy 
measures. What should be the different roles of EU, national, regional and local authorities? 
What are the conditions under which an EU-wide approach is more appropriate?  Second, we 
address the expressed desire to establish a link between an EU-level adaptation policy and the 
new Cohesion Policy, i.e. the dual EU policy aims of efficiency and equity, by exploring the 
interplay between allocative and distributive aspects of adaptation conducted or supported by a 
central government within a single framework. How might distributional aspects be 
incorporated into adaptation policy?  We demonstrate that if we explicitly integrate 
distributional aspects, there may be a role for EU policy in the adaptation field, even when the 
adaptation effects are only on a local or national scale.  Moreover, desired distributional effects 
of supporting adaptation can be regarded as co-benefits of EU adaptation support, and 
accordingly, adaptation and cohesion policy may fruitfully be considered jointly.  
According to Feldstein (1974, p. 139), “if expenditure decisions are going to reflect 
distributional preferences [...], economists should help to see that this is done in a systematic 
and consistent way”. In this paper, we provide a proposal for how this could be accomplished 
on a European level by developing a framework that allows for including policy-makers’ 
preferences/weights explicitly.   
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we explore the dimensions of climate policy 
and of public economic policy. We discuss possible reasons why government intervention might 
be required (or why market forces may be unlikely to attain an efficient adaptation) in detail. In 
Section III, we investigate how adaptation policy should be organised within the EU. First, we 
address the question of ‘on which level governmental intervention should take place’, given that 
adaptation measures are rather heterogeneous. Second, we address the question of ‘how 
decisions on adaptation programmes/projects should be made’. We propose a framework for 
decision-making that adheres to the twin EU policy goals of efficiency and equity. This 
framework allows for a transparent governmental decision-making process, where the allocative 
and distributive components are highly visible and distinguishable. Finally, Section IV 
summarises and concludes.  
2.  Dimensions of Climate Policy and Public Economic Policy 
There are two different groups of policies responding to the threat of climate change: 1) 
mitigation policies that intend to combat global warming itself and 2) adaptation policies that 
pursue the prevention of damage caused by global warming, but do not target the prevention of 
global warming itself. The approach to adaptation needs to be different from the way mitigation 
has been handled. While mitigation in response to climate change primarily represents activities 
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to protect nature from society, adaptation constitutes ways of protecting society from nature 
(Stehr and Storch 2005). The IPCC (2001, p. 881) defines more extensively: 
Adaptation is adjustment in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to 
actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts. This term refers to 
changes in processes, practices, or structures to moderate or offset potential damages or 
to take advantage of opportunities associated with changes in climate. 
From a public-economic-policy point of view, two polar groups of adaptation activities can be 
distinguished: 1) those activities which are not contrary to the different objectives of public 
economic policy and 2) those activities which require government intervention (e.g., 
because of free-rider incentives concerning the financing of adaptation measures) in order to be 
provided in a way such that the different objectives of public economic policy are met or at least 
not counteracted.  
According to Musgrave (1959),
2 three basic objectives of public economic policy can be 
distinguished:
3 
1)  establishment of an efficient allocation of resources, 
2)  attainment of the desired/proper distribution of income and wealth, 
3)  economic stabilisation (secure price-level stability and full employment).  
As Musgrave (1959, p. 21) explains, the latter objective should not be accomplished by means 
of modifying the level of public expenditures on goods and services, but rather by means of 
transfers (or taxes) that are proportional to the proper distribution of income (i.e. that are 
distribution neutral). Consequently, adaptation measures do not represent attractive options for 
stabilisation policy, although adaptation measures in turn may have a positive effect on 
economic stability. Hence, we focus our analysis mainly on the other two objectives of public 
economic policy: the allocation and distribution branches. In particular, the distribution branch 
may also contribute to stability, since, as Alesina and Perotti (1996) identify in their analysis, 
income inequality tends to have a negative influence on economic growth. 
As Hansen, Kelley and Weisbrod (1970, p. 364) point out, “distributional issues are at the heart 
of economic efficiency studies” and therefore the idea of economic efficiency goes beyond the 
scope of allocative efficiency. In response to the tendency in the literature to focus only on 
allocative-efficiency considerations, Weisbrod (1968) introduces the concept of “grand 
efficiency”, which subsumes both allocative and distributive aspects. As he contends (1968, p. 
184), distributional considerations are relevant to political decision-makers; “Therefore, when 
economists disregard these distributional considerations, they should not be surprised to find 
that their advice is not necessarily fully heeded by decision-makers”. In line with this way of 
reasoning, Adger et al. (2005, p. 82) argue that the success of adaptation depends “not only on 
its effectiveness in meeting defined goals, but also on issues of equity and perceived legitimacy 
of action.” Moreover, as Weisbrod (1970, p. 119) suggests, since government activities 
designed to alter the allocation of resources have side effects on the distribution of income, they 
may be utilised deliberately for the purpose of income redistribution.  
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Consequently from a public-economic-policy point of view government intervention may 
sometimes be justified, even if allocation-efficient adaptation takes place autonomously or 
spontaneously (e.g., by market behaviour) or in the shape of planned adaptation measures by 
individuals (e.g. building a shelter for one person’s car).
4 The reasons for governmental 
intervention concerning adaptation are discussed by Fankhauser, Smith and Tol (1999, pp. 68-
69), who stress that successful adaptation depends to a large extent on 1) “timely recognition of 
the need to adapt”, which in turn “requires access to reliable and detailed information, and the 
ability to process such information”, 2) “an incentive to adapt”, which in turn requires 
functioning markets or governmental regulation, and 3) “ability to adapt”, which in turn may 
only be given if budget constraints are not too restrictive. 
Stern (2007, p. 411) posits that in many cases the market forces are unlikely to generate efficient 
adaptation, broadly because of the following three reasons (see Figure 1): 
1)  uncertainty and imperfect information,  
2)  missing and misaligned markets (includes public goods issues), and  
3)  financial constraints.  
Figure 1. Different Dimensions of Climate Policy 
 
Referring to Musgrave’s distinction of objectives, the first two reasons (uncertainty and 
imperfect information; missing and misaligned markets) specified by Stern mainly serve as a 
justification for government intervention due to missing allocative efficiency, while the third 
reason (financial constraints) mainly refers to the public-economic-policy objectives related to 
distribution (and stabilisation). However, beyond these three reasons, adaptation measures may 
also be implemented because they serve as a vehicle for redistribution in general. The central 
government may aim at a more equal distribution of income, for example, which may be 
achieved by supporting adaptation mainly in poorer regions. Consequently, beyond the aspect of 
financial constraints threatening the efficiency of adaptation and worsening the outcome for the 
poor, we regard the potential of adaptation measures to effectively redistribute welfare to the 
poor. Therefore, we follow Weisbrod’s (1970, p. 119) advice to deliberately utilise reallocation 
for the purpose of income redistribution.  
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3.  Government’s Role in Adaptation to Climate Change 
Regularly, analyses of adaptation policies are conducted in a piecemeal way. One of the few 
positive exceptions is Smit et al. (1999, 2000) who provide a systematic specification and 
differentiation of adaptation, based on three questions: 1) “adapt to what?” 2) “who or what 
adapts?”; and 3) “how does adaptation occur?”. Furthermore, the question “how good is the 
adaptation?” could be added (Smit et al. 1999, p. 204; 2000, p. 230).  
In contrast to this positive analysis (questions 1)-3)), the questions we will raise in our analysis 
are normative ones, in the sense that they suggest a framework for evaluating whether a given 
adaptation project is ‘good’. These questions are however related to the positive questions 2) 
and 3) in Smit et al. (1999, 2000). More precisely, we develop a framework that allows 
decision-makers to address the following questions: “which decision level is adequate for EU 
adaptation efforts?” and “how to decide on a given selection of adaptation projects?” We argue 
that the extent to which a given adaptation project should be considered ‘good’ ultimately 
depends on the choice of decision level and the project selection procedure, and the extent to 
which such choices adhere to efficiency and equity concerns.  
In this paper, our focus is exclusively on the governmental sphere. There exists a broad range of 
options for the government to respond to the threat of climate change by supporting adaptation. 
Among these, Fankhauser et al. (1999, p. 74) argue that perhaps the main role for government 
will be to provide the right legal, regulatory and socio-economic environment to support 
autonomous adaptation. However, sometimes it may be insufficient just to actuate autonomous 
adaptation. In particular, this is the case for public goods, i.e. goods characterised by being non-
rival in consumption and having non-excludable benefits, such as large-scale coastal defence 
structures and river-basin management. The reason why governments may need to intervene in 
such cases is that such public good provision is often limited by free-rider incentives and is at 
risk of being underprovided. 
According to Leary (1999, p. 309), “policies directed at adapting the provision of public goods 
to climate change and climate variability” are the most compelling cases where there is a 
rationale for not solely or heavily relying on autonomous adjustments of private agents, but for 
applying (additionally) public adaptation policy. In line with this reasoning, we will focus on 
the public goods aspects when we address policies to restore allocative efficiency in our 
analysis, i.e. we widely omit policies mitigating uncertainty and imperfect information. 
There are different kinds of public adaptation goods. The heterogeneity of these goods is 
addressed in the subsequent section, where we describe the different geographical spheres 
affected by adaptation policies as well as the different technologies of public supply aggregation 
(TPSA).  
3.1  Heterogeneity of public adaptation goods 
Public adaptation goods are highly diverse, both with regard to their geographical coverage and 
the supply technologies. Adaptation policy has to carefully take into account the heterogeneity 
of the characteristics of individual adaptation options.  
In order to illustrate the heterogeneity, first, we distinguish public adaptation goods concerning 
the geographic dimensions of their benefits, i.e. between local/regional/national, EU-
wide/transboundary and global public goods. Second, we take a look at different technologies of 
public supply aggregation (TPSAs) associated with adaptation options. By employing examples 
of three different technologies we illustrate the respective heterogeneity of public adaptation 
goods, which is regularly ignored.   6 | AAKRE & RÜBBELKE 
 
3.1.1 Geographical  dimensions  of public adaptation goods 
There is a wide range of adaptation measures whose provision may be supported by 
governments because of their public good properties (see Table 1) and these measures may have 
effects on either sub-national or national (national public goods), EU-wide/transnational (EU-
wide or transboundary public goods) or global (global public goods) levels.  
Protection against landslides is a measure to protect the regional public good `infrastructure´, 
which may be subsumed under the concept of national public goods, i.e. public goods that do 
not exert effects that spill over across international boundaries.  
Often river-basin management measures have transnational or EU-wide effects, and hence, 
constitute an example of what may be considered an EU-wide public good. 
Support to poor countries in their efforts to adapt to climate change may prevent the 
international spread of illnesses or conflicts. The reasoning behind this is as follows: if 
developing countries are heavily affected by an extreme event like a flood, then there may not 
be enough capacity in these countries to prevent the induced spread of epidemic diseases on an 
international level. Furthermore, refugees leaving affected developing countries may lead to 
conflicts outside theses countries. Consequently, international adaptation support or cooperation 
helps to preserve international health as well as international security. International health (or 
prevention of the spread of illnesses) and security (prevention of violent attacks) exhibit 
properties of international or even of global public goods.  
Table 1. Examples of adaptation measures and the geographical dimensions of their effects 
National/Domestic Public 
Goods (Including Local and 
Regional Effects)  
EU-Wide/Transboundary 
Public Goods 
Global Public Goods 
Protection against landslides by 
constructing an entrenchment  
River-basin management  Support of adaptation in 
vulnerable developing countries 
→ prevention of refugee 
disasters and armed conflicts 
Protection against floods by 
constructing dikes 
Provision of information about 
impacts of climate change and 
adaptation options (EU-focus) 
Provision of information about 
impacts of climate change and 
adaptation options (in general) 
Storage of drinking water  Implementation of a satellite-
based fire detection system 
Arrangement and maintenance 
of a coordination scheme for 
international assistance after 
extreme weather events (e.g. 
preventing the spread of 
epidemic diseases after 
flooding). 
 
Furthermore, all countries could benefit from the dissemination of general information about 
climate change impacts and adaptation options. There is non-rivalry in consumption prevailing 
as well as – largely – non-excludability in the consumption of such information. Consequently, 
the provision of such information is a global public good. 
3.1.2  Technologies of public supply aggregation 
Different adaptation measures are associated with different technologies of public supply 
aggregation (TPSAs). TPSAs describe the relationship between an individual agent’s ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 7 
 
contribution to a public good and the total quantity of the public good available for consumption 
(see Sandler 1998, p. 224).  
Sandler and Arce M. (2002, pp. 207-208) explain that assessment of health risks and education 
of people about a disease are contributions to public goods whose TPSAs can be formulated as 
summation technologies. In a similar way we could argue that assessment of risks of climate 
change and education of people about climate change impacts and adaptation options contribute 
to public goods whose TPSAs can be represented by a summation technology. The total 
awareness and knowledge of climate change risks cumulates with overall educational actions, 
for example. Given the summation technology, the total amount of a public good (e.g., 
knowledge about climate change risks) is the sum of all individual contributions to this public 
good, i.e. individual provisions are added together in order to determine the aggregate level of 
the public good available to recipients.  
In contrast, river-basin management that contributes to the prevention of overflows may be 
regarded as being associated with a weighted-sum technology. The international public good 
`prevention of overflows at the river Rhine´ may affect several European countries 
(Switzerland, Austria, Liechtenstein, France, Germany and the Netherlands) located along this 
river. Yet, the importance of contributions to this kind of European public good differs among 
the countries located at this river. Of course, the measures accomplished in an upstream country 
like Switzerland and which affect all downstream countries, tend to be more important than the 
ones in the downstream country the Netherlands. Consequently, the individual contributions to 
the public good should be weighted according to their effects on the total provision of the public 
good, before they are added together in order to find the aggregate level of the public good 
available to recipients.  
Dike construction is an example of a public good associated with a weakest-link technology, as 
discussed by Hirshleifer (1983) in his seminal paper on the weakest-link concept. Here, the 
weakest-link in the defence structure of a dike determines the provision level of the public good 
‘protection against the flood’. 
3.2  Decisions about adaptation in the European Union 
Before EU adaptation policy is conducted not only the nature of individual adaptation measures 
(which TPSA and which geographical influence?) but also the underlying decision rules should 
be determined, i.e. responsibilities should be assigned to individual government levels and 
adequate procedures for decision-making should be outlined.  
In a first step, we analyse on which government level (national or EU level) decisions about 
producing public adaptation goods should be made. We confine the analysis to aspects of 
allocative efficiency, although distributive aspects are implicitly involved. Then, in a next step, 
we explicitly integrate distributional aspects into the analysis, which may provide some 
justification for EU intervention, even if local or national public adaptation goods are 
considered. We examine how decisions about local or national public adaptation goods should 
be accomplished on the EU level, when decision-makers’ preferences about income distribution 
have to be taken into account. 
3.2.1  Which decision level? 
Let us consider the standard public good case where the summation technology applies on an 
international level. The effects of an adaptation measure ai are assumed to spill over to all 
considered countries and the total amount of adaptation (A) is the sum of one country i’s own 
provision  ) ( i a  and the provision  ) ( i A−  by all other countries.  Yet, the provision of public 8 | AAKRE & RÜBBELKE 
 
adaptation activities has different impacts   on the actual public good level enjoyed in the 
individual countries, where the public good Xi(A) can be quite generally be assumed as 
“mitigation of climate change induced loss”. In countries which are very vulnerable to climate 
change, an adaptation measure A in the shape of “generating information about adaptation 
options by means of research” will have a stronger effect   than in countries which are not 
very vulnerable. The marginal utility of a country i stemming from adaptation can be expressed 
as follows: 
     .        ( 1 )  
Of the two partial derivatives on the right-hand side, the second is the marginal physical product 
of input A for country i, and the first is the valuation of the marginal product. The valuation  , 
i.e. the marginal utility damage reduction, may also differ among countries, e.g. it may differ 
between rich and poor countries. 
With regard to the decision-making of individual countries we postulate Nash behaviour or 
zero-conjectures, i.e. each country i observes the current level of  i A− and conjectures that this 
provision level by the other countries will persist independently of any modification in its own 
provision level. 
Let us regard a two-commodity world where the welfare of the individual countries depends 
positively on the extent X of becoming more adapted and on the level y of private good 
consumption. Each country i has an exogenously fixed initial endowment of  i I  units of the 
private good. As the price of a unit of the private good is normalised to unity, one may think of 
i I  as country i’s private income. 
Country i’s preferences over y and X can be expressed by the welfare function  )) ( , ( A X y U i i i  
which is assumed to be continuous, strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave and everywhere 
twice differentiable with respect to its two arguments  i y  and Xi. Country i maximises its utility 
derived from the consumption of the public good X and the private good  i y  subject to its 
budget constraint  : I c a y i i i = +  
       (2) 
 s.t.    ,        ( 3 )  
with i = 1,..., n. c stands for a constant uniform price, which the country has to pay for each unit 
of adaptation it provides. Maximising utility in (2) subject to the budget constraint (3) yields the 
first-order condition: 
     .        ( 4 )  
Hence, country i provides the public good up to the level where its marginal rate of substitution 
between public and private good MRS =     becomes equal to the price ratio c. ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 9 
 
If we face the case that the adaptation measure is a European public good, i.e., a measure that 
generates transnational benefits exclusively in the European Union, the behaviour compatible 
with (4) is not Pareto efficient. For an outcome to be Pareto efficient, the EU consisting of 27 
member states will have to agree upon a regulation that instructs each individual member state 
to produce that adaptation level which is consistent with the maximisation of the whole EU’s 
welfare  . Hence, the EU 
faces the following maximisation problem 
   (5) 
                                s.t.                  .     (6) 
Welfare maximisation yields the condition that requires the sum over all 27 countries’ marginal 
rates of substitution between the public and the private good to be equal to the respective price 
ratio: 
    .       (7) 
Consequently, each country provides the public adaptation good up to a level where the sum of 
all EU-countries’ marginal rates of substitution between public and private good   = 
  becomes equal to the price ratio c, i.e., transnational spillovers have to be taken 
into account. Yet, if there are no such spillovers, i.e., we face a local or national public good, 
then the utility function of country i would become   Consequently, condition (7) 
would reduce to condition (4). Therefore, from an allocative-efficiency point of view, the EU is 
required to intervene only in cases where transnational spillovers take place within the EU.  
However, in case of transnational spillovers which are global, decision-makers also have to take 
into account spillover effects coming from and exerted on the rest of the world, i.e., it is not 
welfare maximising to rely just on condition (7). With respect to European welfare 
maximisation, free-rider incentives are important. If the EU raises its adaptation efforts in order 
to internalise EU-wide spillovers, for example, countries outside the EU may take a free (or 
easy) ride on the EU’s increased adaptation efforts (e.g., in the case of fundamental research on 
adaptation) and may mitigate own efforts. The lowered adaptation level outside the EU would 
imply a lower level of positive adaptation effects spilling over to the EU.  
3.2.2  How to decide? 
If we explicitly integrate distributional aspects, there may be a role for EU policy in the 
adaptation field, even when the adaptation effects are only on a local or national scale. The EU 
could exploit the distributive consequences of providing adaptation. Desired distributional 
effects of supporting adaptation can be regarded as co-benefits of EU adaptation support.
5 
Weisbrod (1970, p. 129) points out that “[I]f the equity effects of a particular program are 
sufficiently favorable, it may be worthwhile to sacrifice some economic efficiency, but in any 
                                                      
5 However, as Pearce (1997, p. 212) points out in his analysis addressing benefit-cost issues in the 
developed and developing world: “using projects to correct for fundamental inequalities in income 
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event, account needs to be taken of both types of program consequences”.
6 Sandmo (1998, p. 
380) also stresses the importance of both efficiency and equity concerns: “Just as tax distortions 
represent the cost of redistribution, a more equal distribution is the gain from distortions. Both 
need to be taken into account in a balanced evaluation of the marginal cost of public funds.”
7  
In this section we focus on the production of local or national public adaptation goods. 
Furthermore, we do not regard two different goods categories (private and adaptation good) as 
in the previous subsection, but instead consider one good category (adaptation good) 
exclusively by investigating the selection of different individual adaptation projects (like dike 
construction projects). Given a limited budget, the EU has to decide on which projects – which 
may differ by type and host region – to finance, since not all possible options can be funded. 
The choice should be – on the one hand – guided by the pursuit of allocative efficiency. On the 
other hand, in line with the policy goals of solidarity and cohesion, distributional aspects also 
have to be taken into account (European Commission, 2007a; b). 
Let us consider the benefits W
i of a single adaptation option produced in a region i located 
within the EU. Similar to the representation by Eckstein (1958), we can define: 
    ,        ( 8 )  
where   is region i’s marginal utility of money,
 8   are the physical benefits caused by the 
project in region i and p is the market price of   C
i are the project costs. Based on Eckstein’s 
concept we propose the following scheme:
9 
    .        ( 8 ’ )  
The higher the weighted net benefits per costs,  , of a project, the more attractive it tends 
to be from the EU-decision-maker’s point of view. Given a limited budget, the decision-maker 
will only select the most profitable projects and the remaining projects (with lower ) will 
drop out. We divide the difference between weighted benefits and costs by the cost, because we 
suppose that the EU intends to maximise the net benefits and therefore, (8’) tends to be a proper 
profitability indicator.
10 
Yet, we have to take account of the fact that the beneficial effects of adaptation may not have a 
market price and therefore p is subject to a non-market evaluation. As we can observe from the 
marginal benefit depiction   for public goods (in terms of marginal numeraire-good 
benefits) on the left-hand side of (4), there is the expression for the marginal physical benefit 
                                                      
6 Johansson-Stenman (2005) shows that the use of distributional weights in the cost-benefit analysis 
regarding publicly provided goods does not necessarily imply inefficiency losses.   
7 Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) explore implications of partly dependency of individual welfare upon 
relative consumption for public policies that redistribute income via progressive income taxation.  
8 Brent (1984, p. 226) points out that redistribution in kind or using public projects is the basic 
justification for employing distributional weights in benefit-cost analyses.  
9 We disregard the fund-raising aspects here. Yet, we may assume that the EU-expenses for adaptation are 
covered in a lump-sum fashion by all individual regions. 
10 Otherwise, given the same   for two projects, the project with   would 
be as attractive as the project with , although the latter project would 
generate a higher yield per monetary unit invested. ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 11 
 
 (mitigated damage loss) of adaptation included which in the one-good case - represented by 
equations (8) and (8’) - has its counterpart in B.
11 Furthermore, there is also a valuation 
component   included which can be interpreted as the marginal benefit of damage 
prevention (in terms of marginal numeraire-good benefits). The valuation component in (4) has 
its counterpart in value p in the one-good case. Were it the case that the utility function in (2) 
reflects welfare in utility units or ‘utils’ – instead of monetary units –, welfare effects in such 
utility units can be conveniently converted into monetary benefits by dividing the expression by 
the marginal utility of income.
12 Yet, the traditional school sets distributional weights equal to 
unity anyhow: “the competitive demand price for a given unit measures the value of that unit to 
the demander” and “when evaluating the net benefits or costs of a given action [...], the costs 
and benefits accruing to each member of the relevant group (e.g. nation) should normally be 
added without regard to the individual(s) to whom they accrue” (Harberger 1971, p. 785).
13 As 
long as there is no market price existing, the value of p may be approximated by means of 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) analyses. However, as Munda (1996, p. 164) points out: “WTP 
depends upon the ability to pay, thus projects which benefit higher income groups would 
generally be considered to be the best.” Azar (1999, p. 249) refers to WTP in developing and 
industrialised countries and stresses that due to lower per-capita-income levels in poor 
countries, the WTP based estimates of damages in poor countries tend to be lower than in the 
industrialised world even if the impact is the same in human, physical or ecological terms. He 
suggests that one way to deal with this outcome “would be to introduce weight factors based on 
the different marginal value of money in the different regions of the world”, i.e. he recommends 
assigning higher weights to poor regions (Azar, 1999, p. 249). Drèze (1998, p. 488) affirms this 
view: “In a world of resilient inequalities, it is hard to justify giving uniform weights to the 
benefits of a public project, irrespective of who enjoys them”.  
Yet, as Nash, Pearce and Stanley (1975, p. 127) remark, weights involving the income elasticity 
of the marginal utility of income cannot be measured. Therefore, rather than seeking to find the 
value of   which precisely reflects the marginal utility of money, what we are interested in here 
is in   as a political weighting factor that reflects the pursuit of political objectives.
14 These 
may however include the aim of more equal income distribution.
15  
In our analysis we presuppose that the valuation p of prevented damages has already been 
assessed, e.g., by means of the WTP concept. According to Fankhauser, Tol and Pearce (1997, 
p. 250): “There is nothing unfair per se in differentiated WTP/WTA values.” Thus, we focus on 
the second part – the weighting factor   – of the controversy which can be separated into two 
different issues: 
                                                      
11 For a discussion of the compatibility of those approaches considering two goods (like equation (2)) 
with those considering only one good (like equations (8) and (8’)), see Rübbelke (2002, p. 29). 
12 For the conversion of utils into monetary units given a social welfare function of the Bergson-
Samuelson form, see Fankhauser, Tol and Pearce (1997, p. 254).  
13 The latter postulate is important for the design of the welfare function in (5). Harberger (1971, p. 785) 
adds a third postulate: “the competitive supply price for a given unit measures the value of that unit to the 
supplier”. These three basic postulates provide the traditional framework for applied welfare economics. 
14 Johansson-Stenman (2000, p. 299) notes: “In practice, distributional weights are not very often applied 
in CBA, partly because the distributional consequences are often believed to be minor.”  
15 Harberger (1978, p. 119) notes that low income by itself is not a sufficient index of social concern. He 
adds that we are, e.g., also concerned about the human suffering connected with unemployment. 12 | AAKRE & RÜBBELKE 
 
the valuation of environmental damages at an individual level, which is a matter of 
empirical analysis, and the comparison and aggregation of these effects, which is a 
political process involving ethical judgments on, among other things, the socially 
desirable distribution of income (Fankhauser et al., 1997, p. 250). 
Put differently, we intend to impute to some individuals external benefits connected with the 
improvement in the circumstances of others and model a decision scheme that integrates these 
external benefits. To make the point more clear, we refer to Harberger’s (1984) distinction 
between “distributional weights” and “basic needs” approaches.  
The “distributional weights” approach takes account of the fact that the marginal utility of an 
extra dollar or euro to a rich person is lower than that of the same dollar or euro to a poor 
person.
16 In contrast, the ‘basic needs’ approach is based on the assumption that people receive a 
benefit from acts of supporting poor/disadvantaged people (e.g., healing the sick, feeding the 
hungry, etc.). Harberger (1984, p. 455) notes: “Similar motivations may also lie behind 
legislation in which societies have accepted a collective responsibility for meeting the medical, 
educational, nutritional and housing needs of their less fortunate citizens.” Such legislation 
addressing collective responsibilities also exists on an EU level. By reference to the objectives 
of the EU cohesion policy we will explain how distributional aspects can be included in EU 
decision-making. Although we mainly pursue the ‘basic needs’ approach, we nevertheless 
employ weighting factors like in the ‘distributional weights’ approach.
17 
An alternative way of describing the employed approach is that of a management science 
approach, as discussed by Nash, Pearce and Stanley (1975, pp. 130-131). As Eckstein describes 
(1961, p. 445), “the economist must interpret the desires of the policy people whom he is 
serving and express them in an analytical form as an objective function.” We seek to construct 
and maximise such an objective function given the empirical relations and institutional 
constraints in the EU.  
The modelling of weights. The EU distinguishes three objectives of cohesion policy: 1) 
convergence, 2) regional competitiveness and employment, and 3) European territorial 
cooperation. The relevance of unemployment for EU policy has been also stressed in the Lisbon 
Strategy, which aims at making the EU the most competitive economy in the world and 
achieving more and better employment. Due to the multiplicity of objectives we have to apply a 
multiple indicator index (see Brent 1984, p. 223). 
Next, we proceed on the assumption that, in general, EU projects located in countries and 
regions with low per capita income levels and high unemployment rates as well as interregional 
and transnational projects tend to be preferred to projects in more prosperous regions and those 
which do not require interregional/transnational cooperation. This is in line with what is 
generally perceived in the EU as a collective responsibility for the less fortunate regions. 
Moreover, it takes account of the fact that financial constraints to adaptation are most intensely 
perceived by the poor and that insufficient adaptation by the poor makes them more vulnerable 
than the rich.
18 Hence, they tend to be the main victims of climate change, which worsens their 
                                                      
16 Another reason – in addition to the reason of utilities being concave in income – for applying 
distributional weights is that the social welfare function is concave or quasi-concave in utilities, so that a 
utility rise from a low level augments social welfare more than the same utility increase from a high level 
(see Johansson-Stenman, 2000, p. 301). 
17 Consider that the European Commission considers equity-weighted global marginal cost estimates for 
CO2 in its cost-benefit analysis of domestic climate policies (European Commission, 2005: 20-21).  
18 “As an overall tendency, vulnerability may decrease as national income grows” (Fankhauser et al., 
1999, p. 76). ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 13 
 
financial situation. Therefore, the adverse distributional impacts consist of an exacerbation of 
existing inequalities. These adverse impacts can be addressed by EU policy intervention 
supporting adaptation in poor regions. 
Consequently, the function   takes the following shape: 
    ,        ( 9 )  
which is in fact an indicator that assigns the level of distributional adequacy to a project, where 
 reflects the country’s or region’s (un)employment (  is equal to 1 minus the unemployment 
rate in i),   the per-capita income and   indicates to which extent the project is interregional 
(within a nation).   is the larger, the more the decision-maker assesses the project to have 
interregional/transnational character.   could take the functional form derived and described in 
Appendix 2.1. 
In line with McGuire and Garn (1969), we describe an index which takes on a set of values  , 
with    This set gathers equity aspects, and the value of an individual   is the higher, 
the poorer the respective region i performs (compared to the average). The different equity 
aspects included in the index have to be weighted. The weights reflect the subjective judgments 
of decision-makers.
19  
In a first step, we consider adaptation measures with national impacts, i.e. projects that 
constitute mainly a national public good, and therefore choose EU member state-level data – 
instead of smaller regional entities – as references. In a second step, we take a look at adaptation 
measures that have local effects only, i.e. at the level of smaller regional entities. We omit the 
interregional/transnational component t
i for the following two reasons: 1) We focus on 
adaptation activities which are purely regional or purely national public goods, i.e. there are no 
spillovers affecting areas outside the considered region/country; and 2) our main interest is in 
aspects of equity (regarding income and employment). 
Nationally public adaptation. The average GDP per capita at current market prices in the EU-25 
was  23,400 Euro in 2005.
20 The rate   (= 1 – minus the average unemployment rate in the 
EU-25) in the EU-25 was 91.2. For  , we can write: 
       ,      ( 1 0 )  
where we set   and furthermore, we assume that  . For a derivation of 
the functional form of  , see Appendix 2.2.  
Taking a closer look at Spain (see Table 2 in Appendix 1) for instance, we face numbers for per-
capita income and employment that are approximately equal to the EU-25 averages. Therefore, 
efficiency should be a stronger criterion regarding projects in Spain than regarding those in 
countries which perform worse (and where the distribution factor should play a more important 
role). Latvia constitutes one example of such a country. For Latvia we get a value for   which 
is equal to  , that means, the benefits  of a project accomplished in Latvia get a 
                                                      
19 Munda (1996, p. 162) stresses that “there is no escape from value judgements.” He discusses possible 
approaches for getting distributional weights. 
20 Data are from Eurostat (2007a). 14 | AAKRE & RÜBBELKE 
 
higher weight, because there is a need for redistribution due to a very low average per capita 
income. In contrast, the   for Spain is only  . 
A priori, it is not so clear how a trade-off between employment and income should be assessed. 
Depending on the decision-makers’ subjective judgments, the components can be weighted in 
different ways, which is reflected by the parameters   and  . They also determine the relative 
importance of distributional issues compared to the objective of efficiency. 
Cyprus has a rather high employment level, while the average per-capita income level is quite 
low. Conversely, Germany has an employment level that is below the EU-25 average, but a high 
average per-capita income compared to the EU-25 average. Again, the decision-maker would 
need to subjectively weight the relative importance of unemployment compared to low income 
levels.   
It seems reasonable (although in a way subjective) to claim that countries in which income and 
employment levels are above average should not be penalised, but concerning these countries 
the decision-maker should make his decisions solely on efficiency grounds, i.e. the relevant 
decision criterion is the level of  . Therefore, if  , we may set   in equation 
(10) and if  , we may set   in equation (10). The respective results can be 
observed from Table 2 (see Appendix 1). 
Regionally public adaptation. In this section we take a look at a selection of NUTS I regions 
that have a poor performance either with regard to employment or per-capita income. In contrast 
to the preceding section, we consider the EU-27 in 2005. The average EU-27 employment level 
(1 – unemployment rate) and per-capita income were 91.0 and 22.400 Euro, respectively. For   
in region i, we can write: 
   ,        ( 1 1 )  
i.e., we set   
As can be observed comfortably from the numbers in Table 3 (see Appendix 1), there is in 
many cases a trade-off between per-capita income levels and employment levels. So, given the 
same benefit pB
i and cost C
i levels of two projects – for instance the one located in the poor 
Romanian region of Macroregiunea Doi and the Belgian region of Bruxelles-Cap./Brussels 
Hfdst. which has a high unemployment level – which should be undertaken, if there is money 
available for only one of these projects?  
For the Romanian region we get:  
   ,        ( 1 2 )  
and for the Belgian region we obtain: 
     .        ( 1 3 )  
As we can derive by equating (12) with (13), a decision-maker should be indifferent between 
both projects if: 
     .          ( 1 4 )  ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 15 
 
Yet, if the left-hand side is larger (smaller) than the right-hand side, then the EU should select 
the adaptation project in Belgium (Romania). Therefore, the decision about the right project 
depends on the weight the EU-decision-makers assign to employment vs. income.   
Again, projects in regions that meet the EU-27 average numbers or even perform better should 
be assessed exclusively by efficiency criteria.  
In order to illustrate how the weighting factor could be designed for project selection purposes, 
we select the following set of conditions (of course, the decision-maker may choose to rely on 
different conditions): 
1)  , if   and   (91% is the average employment rate and 22,400 the 
average per-capita income in the EU-27 in 2005). 
2)  If  , then we set   and if    then we set   
3)  In the worst performing areas we choose  . We choose Départements d’Outre-Mer 
(because it has the lowest employment rate of the regions gathered in Table 3) with 
 and   and Macroregiunea Doi (because it exhibits the lowest per-
capita income of the regions exposed in Table 3) with   and  . 
4)   and we assume that  . 
Application of these conditions yields (calculations are displayed in Appendix 3): 
       ( 1 5 )  
In Figure 2, the different weightings of regions are illustrated for four NUTS I regions (for 
weighting factors of selected NUTS I regions see Table 3 in Appendix 1).  
Figure 2. Alternative levels of income and employment which have the same   
 
As can be easily observed, a lower weighting factor is assigned to Voreia Ellada than to Isole. 
Isole’s projects should – in turn – be judged to a greater extent according to efficiency criteria 
than projects in Pólnocny. The lowest weighing factor of the four displayed regions is assigned 16 | AAKRE & RÜBBELKE 
 
to Severna i Iztochna Bulgaria. The regions Départements d’Outre-Mer and Macroregiunea Doi 
are not displayed but they are located on the curve reflecting the income and employment levels 
with   
Our suggestion is to use such weights, in order to make sure that decisions on projects reflect 
the objectives of EU policy as well as their implicit distributional preferences in a consistent 
way. Politicians should agree on a reference weighting, evaluating trade-offs between 
objectives. Deviations from this consensus could be justified in individual cases, but they should 
be reported and explained by giving reference to the agreed reference weighting.  
A structured analysis in the run-up of decision-making is especially important because of the 
heterogeneous patterns regarding vulnerability, employment and income levels in individual 
regions. 
The figures in Appendix 4 illustrate the heterogeneity of NUTS I regions according to their 
vulnerability, per-capita-income and employment rates. Furthermore, the (degree of) trade-offs 
between these three decision criteria are dissimilar among individual regions. Yet, those regions 
most vulnerable to climate change - in the sense that they exhibit a high share of agriculture in 
the economic performance – tend to have a low per-capita income level. The relationship 
between share of agriculture in the economic performance and employment rate is however 
more ambiguous. These instances make decisions rather difficult: the more vulnerable regions, 
i.e. those where the highest benefit from adaptation (at given cost) can be expected, tend to have 
low per-capita-income levels and consequently seem to be attractive as recipients of EU 
support. However, from the employment levels we do not derive any strong advice regarding 
the eligibility of vulnerable regions (high share of agriculture) to become beneficiaries.  
Like the agricultural sector, the tourism sector is vulnerable to climate change. Regions with 
higher tourism intensities (i.e. the number of tourist bed-places or number of tourist nights in a 
region compared with its population) tend to exhibit higher employment rates (see Eurostat, 
2008a, pp. 6-7). Yet, the picture regarding per-capita-income levels is ambiguous (see Appendix 
4).  
4. Summary  and  Conclusions 
By now, there is broad consensus that climate policy aimed at mitigation must be complemented 
by measures inducing adaptation to climate change. However, since adaptation may be 
conducted in inefficient ways, governmental intervention may sometimes be required. For the 
EU, which is a multi-level system consisting of heterogeneous member states and regions, this 
raises the question of what constitutes the right level of intervention (local, national or EU) and 
appropriate evaluation standards for adaptation projects. The necessity of addressing these 
questions is accentuated by the fact that – compared to mitigation – adaptation has been a 
largely disregarded policy field of climate policy until only recently, and research is still in an 
early stage (European Commission, 2007). However, much can be learnt from past research in 
other fields. 
We started our analysis by making the traditional distinction between the public finance 
branches of allocation (efficiency), distribution (equity) and stabilisation and classifying the 
reasons for governmental intervention concerning adaptation by subsuming them under the 
individual branches. We proceeded by exploring what roles the government should play in order 
to improve the outcome of adaptation to climate change by considering two questions: 1) what 
constitutes the right level of decision-making within the EU for a given project, and 2) what 
constitutes adequate adaptation project selection?  ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 17 
 
One important field of action for EU adaptation policy is the provision of public goods. Public 
adaptation goods are heterogeneous, as we illustrated by describing different technologies of 
public supply aggregation associated with individual adaptation measures. Restricting our 
analysis to the standard case of a summation technology, we showed that decisions on EU-wide 
public adaptation goods should – from an allocative efficiency point of view – be made on the 
EU-level. In contrast, it is unclear whether decision-making on global public adaptation should 
be centralised to the EU-level, since spillover effects could cause a welfare reduction within the 
EU. Conversely, in order to get an efficient allocation in the case of national/domestic public 
adaptation goods, national government intervention in adaptation efforts may be justified, 
especially when taking into account that national governments may have information 
advantages on local/regional adaptation compared with decision-makers at the EU-level.  
While the allocation branch does not identify any rationale for EU intervention in the case of 
national public adaptation, the distribution branch would under certain conditions suggest 
otherwise. This is because co-benefits can be generated by implementing adaptation projects, 
and these benefits may be higher in some EU regions than in others. The co-benefits are derived 
from pursuing adaptation and cohesion policies simultaneously. The EU could conduct an 
adaptation policy by allocating projects preferentially in regions where there is more need for 
support than in others, i.e. regions with low per-capita income and high unemployment rates, 
which are mainly intended to be supported by cohesion policies.  
Motivated by the recently stated need to develop an EU adaptation policy that takes into 
consideration both efficiency and equity concerns, we propose a framework for selecting 
amongst different adaptation projects. The framework presented here enables a transparent 
decision-making process, since universal weightings of the individual objectives have to be 
agreed upon prior to the actual decision-making. Deviations from the predetermined weighting 
factors should be explained and justified. These weightings are no inflexible standards, but 
serve as reference for actual decision-making. Thereby inconsistencies and unsystematic ways 
of decision-making can be prevented. 
Our analysis of adequate EU-decision-making on adaptation measures has its special appeal by 
also being applicable to projects in other policy fields in the EU.  18 | 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Overviews of Data for European Countries and Regions 
Table 2. Employment and income data (EU-25, in 2005) 
Country   (= 1 - unemployment 
rate in i)  
 (= GDP per 
capita, in PPS)  
 
Belgium  91.6  27,600  1 
Czech Republic  92.1  17,100 1/2+1/2(1.37)
β 
Denmark  95.2  29,100  1 
Germany 90.5  25,700  1/2+1/2(1.01)
α 
Estonia  92.1  13,400  1/2+1/2(1.75)
β 
Greece 90.2  19,200  1/2+1/2(1.01
α + 1.22
β) 
Spain  90.8  23,100  1/2+1/2(1.01)
β 
France 90.3  25,500  1/2+1/2(1.01)
α 
Ireland  95.7  32,100  1 
Italy 92.3  24,100  1 
Cyprus  94.7  19,500  1/2+1/2(1.2)
β 
Latvia 91.1  11,000  1/2+1/2(2.13)
β 
Lithuania  91.7  12,200  1/2+1/2(1.92)
β 
Luxembourg 95.5  58,000  1 
Hungary  92.8  14,300  1/2+1/2(1.64)
β 
Malta 92.7  16,200  1/2+1/2(1.44)
β 
Netherlands  95.3  28,900  1 
Austria 94.8  28,700  1 
Poland  82.3  11,700  1/2+1/2(1.09
α + 2
β) 
Portugal 92.4  16,700  1/2+1/2(1.4)
β 
Slovenia  93.5  18,700  1/2+1/2(1.25)
β 
Slovakia 83.7  12,900  1/2+1/2(1.09
α + 1.81
β) 
Finland  91.6  25,200  1 
Sweden 92.2  26,900  1 
UK  95.3  27,300  1 
EU-25 91.2  23,400   
Source: Eurostat (2007a) and own calculations.  22 | AAKRE & RÜBBELKE 
 
Table 3. Employment and Income Data (selected NUTS I regions in the EU-27, in 2005) 
Region   (= 1 – unemployment 
rate in i) 
 (= GDP per 
capita, in PPS) 
(for   
and  ) 
Bruxelles-Cap./Brussels Hfdst  83.7  53,876  2.46 
Région Wallonne  88.2  19,592  1.53 
Severna i Iztochna Bulgaria  88.8  6,663  12.15 
Yugozapadna i Yuzhna tsentralna   91.0  9,289  5.35 
Berlin  80.8  22,075  3.81 
Brandenburg 81.9  17,800  3.56 
Bremen  83.5  35,184  2.45 
Hamburg 89.6  45,271  1.14 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  78.7  17,547  5.93 
Niedersachsen 89.6  22,704  1.14 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  89.6  25,597  1.14 
Saarland 89.2  24,698  1.19 
Sachsen  81.3  18,863  3.76 
Sachsen-Anhalt 79.7  18,441  4.91 
Schleswig-Holstein  89.8  22,983  1.12 
Thüringen 82.9  18,010  3.07 
Voreia Ellada  88.6  16,699  1.83 
Kentriki Ellada  89.9  17,442  1.56 
Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti  91.8  18,488  1.32 
Noroeste 90.2  19,663  1.28 
Centro (ES)  89.8  19,340  1.35 
Sur 87.0  18,285  1.86 
Canarias  88.3  20,982  1.40 
Île de France  90.5  38,666  1.04 
Bassin Parisien  91.3  21,911  1.03 ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 23 
 
Nord- Pas-de-Calais  86.8  19,847  1.74 
Est  91.4  21,934  1.03 
Ouest 92.3  22,315  1.01 
Sud-ouest  92.3  22,384  1.00 
Méditerranée 88.5  22,304  1.28 
Départements d’Outre-Mer  73.9  14,698  15,00 
Sud 86.2  15,583  2.46 
Isole  84.7  15,806  2.79 
Dunántúl 93.1  12,651  2.68 
Alföld es Észak  90.8  9,450  5.15 
Centralny 84.3  15,634  2.94 
Poludniowy  82.6  11,325  5.22 
Wschodni 84.1  8,126  8.59 
Pólnocno-Zachodni  81.1  11,507  5.89 
Poludniowo-Zachodni 78.6  11,237  8.05 
Pólnocny  80.3  10,139  7.49 
Continente 92.2  16,832  1.55 
Madeira  95.5  21,255  1.07 
Macroregiunea Unu  92.9  7,794  8.12 
Macroregiunea Doi  93.4  6,074  15.00 
Macroregiunea Trei  91.7  10,612  3.94 
Macroregiunea Patru  93.4  7,489  8.95 
North East   93.9  21,598  1.05 
Wales  95.5  20,643  1.12 
Northern Ireland  95.3  21,726  1.04 
EU-27  91.0  22,400   
Source: Eurostat (2007b, 2008b) and own calculations. 24 | AAKRE & RÜBBELKE 
 
Appendix 2: Derivation of Functional Forms for   
Appendix 2.1 
Let us express the welfare of a country/region i as a function of employment level, per capita 
income and interregional/international integration: 
   U , 
where 
L =     size of labour force, 
E = E/L =  employment rate in the considered country/region, 
e =     employment in the considered country/region, 
N =     number of inhabitants in the considered country/region, 
Y = y/N =  average per-capita income, 
y =     total income in the considered country/region. 
 
It holds that 
   . 
  
We define:     
     
     
Hence, we get:     
     
     
We interpret additional benefits (expressed in monetary terms) received from a project as 
additional income. Such a project-induced income change has the following effect on welfare: 
    
  
with  . 
Finally, we get:       
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Appendix 2.2 
Let us express the welfare of a country/region i as a function of employment level and per capita 
income: 
   U . 
It holds that 
    .    
We define:      
     
Hence, we get:     
     
We interpret additional benefits (expressed in monetary terms) received from a project as 
additional income. Such a project-induced income change has the following effect on welfare: 
       
with  . 
Finally, we get:     
 
 
Appendix 3: Determination of α and   
Due to the four conditions we set up, it must hold that: 
             (*) 
as well as 
.       ( * * )  
Due to condition 2), equation (*) becomes: 
         ( * ’ )  
Solving (*’) for   yields  . By insertion of   into (**) and solving for   we 
obtain  . 
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Appendix 4: Heterogeneity of NUTS I Regions According to Vulnerability, Per-Capita-
Income and Employment Rates 
Figure 3. Importance of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries vs. Employment. Selected NUTS I 
Regions 2005 
 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
 
Figure 4. Importance of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries vs. GDP per capita. Selected NUTS 
I Regions 2005 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
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Figure 5. Tourism Intensity vs. Employment. NUTS I Regions 2005 
 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
 
Figure 6. Tourism Intensity vs. GDP per capita. NUTS I Regions 2005 
 
 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 